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Complexity Theory and
Al-Qaeda: 
Examining Complex Leadership
Russ Marion & Mary Uhl-Bien
[Osama bin Laden is] a product of a new social structure. A new social
feeling in the Muslim world. Where you have strong hostility not only
against America, but also against many Arab and Muslim regimes who are
allying to America ... And that’s why if bin Laden was not there, you would
have another bin Laden. You would have another name, with the same
character, with the same role, of bin Laden now. That’s why we call it a
phenomena not a person.
Interview with Saad Al-Fagih, PBS online, 2001
Recent events in the world are forcing us to restructure ourunderstanding of leadership and organization. The al-Qaeda organization and its pervasive presence in the worlddemonstrated first-hand the power of a flexible, moder-
ately coupled network of individuals brought together by a common need
and aligned behind an informal and emergent leader. Its structure, which
resulted from bottom-up coordination of individuals who voluntarily
came together based on common need rather than from top-down hier-
archical control, clearly demonstrates the power of a networked system
based on relationships and shared vision and mission. To understand this
and other types of network organizations, traditional models of leadership
and organizational theory may no longer be sufficient, and may perhaps
even limit our ability to realize the capabilities and resilience of such
organizational forms.
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To address such limitations, leadership theorists are exhibiting interest
in new perspectives on organizing such as complexity theory (Boal et al., in
press; Hunt & Ropo, in press; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; McKelvey, in
press; Streatfield, 2001). Complexity theory proposes that organizations are
complex systems composed of a diversity of agents who interact with and
mutually affect one another, leading to spontaneous “bottom-up” emergence
of novel behavior (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Regine & Lewin, 2000).
Because of this, leadership in complex systems requires a shift in thinking
from traditional “command-and-control” models that focus on control and
stifle emergence (McKelvey, in press) to “complex leadership” models
(Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001) that enable interconnectivity and foster dynamic
systems behavior and innovation. In this way, complexity theory helps
explain organizational behavior relative to the “dynamic swirl” of social and
organizational events that influence complex systems and their agents. 
The purpose of this article is to derive propositions regarding com-
plexity and complex leadership (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001) and to illus-
trate them using the case of al-Qaeda. We will argue that the conditions
that led to the emergence of al-Qaeda were conducive to complex leader-
ship, and that complex leadership helps explain the success of this ter-
rorist movement. Although detailed data of the sort needed for rigorous
qualitative analysis are obviously unavailable, we believe that the al-
Qaeda example is such a powerful illustration of complexity concepts that
it merits a nontraditional format for presentation. 
COMPLEX LEADERSHIP
Complex leadership has been recently introduced into organizational
leadership (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001), and differs from traditional mod-
els of leadership on several key issues. First, complex leadership argues
that organizations and their leaders are products of interactive dynamics.
That is, leaders do not create the system but rather are created by it,
through a process of aggregation and emergence.
Second, complex systems are better led by indirect than direct leader-
ship behaviors. Complex leadership moves away from traditional assump-
tions regarding hierarchical bureaucracy and top-down leadership
control (McKelvey, in press). Complex leaders need to temper control
preferences and instead foster and enable bottom-up behaviors and stim-
ulate systems toward emergent surprises.
Third, complex leadership is not necessarily embedded in a formal
position, but more properly permeates the complex organization. That is,
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the differences between “leader” and “follower” are blurred. We coin the
term complex adaptive agent (CAA) to capture this idea and to distance
complex leadership from traditional notions of leadership as a formal
position of control. The term is a deliberative derivation of the common
complexity term complex adaptive systems (Marion, 1999).  
Fourth, complex leaders can more effectively affect the fitness of a sys-
tem by enabling what McKelvey (in press) calls distributed intelligence
(DI). That is, complex leaders foster (as opposed to determine) connec-
tivity among diverse agents and enable effective coupling of structures,
ideas, and innovations to ensure that they are neither too loose nor too
tightly interdependent. 
To describe how this works, we turn next to an overview of complex
leadership and an explanation of why we believe it applies to the case of
al-Qaeda.
COMPLEX LEADERSHIP AND THE CASE OF AL-QAEDA
Complexity theory is, primarily, about the dynamics of networks (Marion,
1999). It is the study of self-reinforcing interdependent interaction and
how such interaction creates evolution, fitness, and surprise. It proposes
that knowledge—the source of innovation, emergence, and structure—is
not the property of individuals or groups but rather emerges out of inter-
actions (Fonseca, 2002).
Viewing organizations from a complexity perspective fundamentally
changes considerations about leadership. In contrast to traditional top-
down, leadership-controlled perspectives, complex adaptive agents view
organizing as a bottom-up dynamic that is generated through interactive
bonding among interdependent, need-seeking individuals, each of whom
is driven by local (bounded) assessments of social and organizational
events. This interactive dynamic can be described in terms of process
theory in that it represents a series of causally linked events. Unlike most
views of process theory (Bryman, 1996), however, complex dynamics are
recursive; they exhibit interdependent, multiway chains of causality, non-
linear behaviors, and multiple, often conflicting, feedback loops. The
recursive aggregation process is too complex to be effectively controlled
or determined by leaders. It may be influenced, however, by leaders who
foster or enable the emergence of complex networks (Marion & Uhl-
Bien, 2001). 
We argue that Islamic terrorism is amenable to complex leadership
because of the context in which it must function. First, the very nature of
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the Islamic radical movement, its demand for operational secrecy juxta-
posed against a highly visible organizational persona, the intricate nature
of resource gathering and allocation, its size, and the incorporation of
many diverse, subautonomous groups inevitably spawned complex
leadership patterns, complex adaptive agents, and a complexly structured
organization. The organization is simply too complex with too many
unique and diverse functions to be tightly led or structured. Second, we
suggest that complex leadership was not deliberately chosen by bin
Laden and his cohorts, but rather was forced on them by conditions—and
that it explains in large measure the success of this organization. 
Specifically, we argue that the nature of Islamic militancy spawned a
complexly structured al-Qaeda led according to complex leadership prin-
ciples. This proposition is a unifying theme throughout this article, and
the events surrounding the emergence and behavior of al-Qaeda will be
interpreted relative to it. Al-Qaeda’s structure is attributable in part to its
guerrilla terrorism strategy, which is much less formalized than is the case
in more traditional military systems. Its structure is also attributable to a
business necessity to sell goods and raise funds (al-Qaeda owns a number
of commercial enterprises), and these businesses are run as formalized
bureaucracies. Al-Qaeda has extensive banking relationships, but its
banking structure is much more informal than western systems (there is
little centralized record keeping, for example). Al-Qaeda’s main business,
terrorism, is fogged in secrecy, and the secrecy, along with the demands
associated with resource acquisition by terrorist cells, intelligence gath-
ering, and general coordination, requires tightly controlled cells that are
loosely to moderately linked with outside resources. 
Al-Qaeda, then, is influenced by broadly diverse systems (distributed
intelligence), some of which are tightly structured, some very loosely
coordinated, but most moderately coupled—particularly with one
another. It is characterized by multiply redundant chains of interaction,
particularly in its banking and money-exchange systems. It possesses
numerous loci of leadership (complex adaptive agents) bound by common
purpose and catalyzed by bin Laden and others. It is structured in ways
that allow it to adapt and learn. That is, al-Qaeda represents a complex
system. 
To illustrate this complex network notion relative to complex leader-
ship and complex adaptive agents, we next propose a set of
complexity/complex leadership propositions and relate them to the emer-
gence and leadership of al-Qaeda.
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ORGANIZATIONS ARISE (AND LEADERS EMERGE)
THROUGH AGGREGATION
Complexity theory proposes that organizations arise, and leaders (acting
as complex adaptive agents) emerge, through a process of aggregation
(Holland, 1995; Kauffman, 1993). Aggregation is the structuring of actors
and activities into forms and ideas; it is the result of recursive interaction,
autocatalysis, and correlation.
The micro dynamic by which aggregation occurs is called correlation.
Correlation describes an emergent dynamic in which interacting and
interdependent units compromise a measure (but not all) of their indi-
vidualistic need preferences to the needs of others and to the needs of an
emergent alliance (this should not to be confused with statistical correla-
tion: Poincaré, 1992; see also Marion, 1999; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001;
Prigogine, 1997). Correlation is a bottom-up process in that it is a func-
tion of interaction among the basic units of a system, although the milieu
in which it occurs is typically influenced (for better or worse) by leader-
ship decisions.
The primary alliances that emerge from the correlational process are
called “aggregates” (Holland, 1995; Marion, 1999), defined as sets of directly
interacting, correlated units. Aggregates are linked interdependently to
other aggregates to form meta-aggregates, such as manufacturing/raw mate-
rial provider relationships. The aggregates in a meta-aggregate exhibit less
direct interactions than do units in an aggregate, but are nonetheless rather
closely interdependent. Alliances of meta-aggregates are labeled field aggre-
gates, defined as inter-influence (as opposed to direct) relationships.
Automobile producers, road construction industries, and auto insurance
companies are part of a field aggregate because of their mutual, albeit indi-
rect, interdependencies.
The process of aggregation creates opportunities for leadership.
Leadership operates in two ways in the aggregation process: first on the
micro level (as we address here), and second on the macro level (as
argued in the next section). On the micro level, units need representa-
tives to conduct negotiations with other units during aggregation. Micro-
level complex leadership behavior may help resolve internal and external
conflicting constraints, defined as need incompatibilities that are often
expressed as task-related conflict (Jehn, 1997). Conflicting constraints are
an inevitable, and important, product of moderately coupled (e.g., com-
plex) systems. They pressure a system to seek solutions that accommo-
date diverse needs (Kauffman, 1993), thus fostering innovation and
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growth. The dynamics by which this occurs also underlie and promote
the correlational process (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). 
Direct leadership behavior (broadly defined as deliberate effort to
influence) can serve to enhance the resolution of conflicting constraints.
Such direct leadership, however, is localized in nature, thus primarily
affecting immediate conflicting constraints. These local events (con-
straints plus local response) become part of a broader web of interactive
dynamics that defy direct leadership because of their overwhelming
complexities. 
From this discussion, we can derive the following propositions:
Proposition 1a: Adaptive, interactive social units coalesce into aggregated
units; these units are bonded by correlational forces that are driven by
conflicting constraints. 
Proposition 1b: Direct leadership behaviors demonstrated by unit mem-
bers help negotiate the interactions that generate correlation.
Correlation and aggregation in turn allow for the emergence of direct
leadership behaviors.
FINDINGS FOR PROPOSITION 1
Aggregation of the militant Islam movement should be understood in sev-
eral dimensions. First, this aggregation process has obviously involved
the coming together of diverse terrorist groups for common purpose.
Second, it should be understood in terms of its accretion of support struc-
tures such as radical Islam groups in the West, banking and money-
changer structures, and resource providers. Finally, this aggregation
dynamic required the emergence of leaders that helped consolidate its
structure and identity. 
Islamic militancy began as nationalistic movements (aggregates) bent
on establishing Islamic governments in their home states. The earliest
modern group, the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared in the 1920s in Egypt
(Emerson, 2002). It was followed in the middle of the twentieth century
by other groups in Egypt, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Libya,
Yemen, and other Middle Eastern nations (Bergen, 2001). These groups
differed largely on the degree of militancy they advocated and in their
nationalistic foci. Cooperative efforts evolved during the war in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, which catalyzed the emergence of an umbrella
organization, MaK, that loosely united a large number of diverse groups
in a common cause (Bergen, 2001). This confederacy was expanded in the
1990s under al-Qaeda, culminating in the 1998 establishment of a
VOLUME #5, ISSUE #1
59
confederation of terrorist groups called the World Islamic Front (Bergen,
2001; US Department of State, 2001). What started, then, as aggregates
in the middle of the twentieth century evolved into meta-aggregates
opposed to Israel in the 1970s, and matured as meta-aggregates in the
1980s and 1990s. 
Our definition of field aggregates hypothesizes the accumulation of
structures with diverse functions linked by a common focus; thus the
alliance of terrorist groups in the 1990s does not constitute a field aggre-
gate. Field aggregates emerged when these aggregates and meta-aggre-
gates became interdependently linked with businesses (bin Laden
invested millions in African companies in particular), governmental
agencies, nongovernmental relief organizations (NGOs), Islam training
schools, radical Islam groups in the West, banking structures, wealthy
supporters, communication outlets, and mosques (see Figure 1 later).
These collateral structures were aligned to lesser or greater extent with
the core terrorist movement in the same sense that auto repair stations
and the plastics industry are allied to lesser or greater extent with the
auto industry. The emergence of these structures alongside the more spe-
cific terrorist groups began under MaK during the Afghan/Soviet war
(Bergen, 2001). It was crucial to the subsequent success of al-Qaeda,
which succeeded MaK after the war, and to its fitness. Without the
broader structure, al-Qaeda would have lacked the money and the ability
to move and hide money, the recruiting capability, the public relations
support, or the expertise to pull off a project as large as the airline attack
on the World Trade Center.
Various correlational dynamics enabled the aggregation of Islamic
groups and ideologies. Militant groups interacted within a number of
contexts, including their common anger over events involving Israel and
Palestine, the Afghan war, and secular Muslim governments such as that
in Egypt (Bergen, 2001). Groups (and their constituents) had common
experiences in al-Qaeda training camps (centers of indoctrination and
military preparation that trained people from numerous militant groups)
and in the Afghan war. Before the Afghan war, Islamic militancy was frac-
tured by nationalistic goals and different opinions about what jihad
entailed (some, for example, saw it as internal struggle, others as external
militancy; Bergen, 2001). Interactions (correlations) in training camps, in
the Afghan war, and over the Palestinian issue helped the various move-
ments resolve their nationalistic differences and identify commonalities.  
Together, these events virtually define what is meant by aggregation,
suggesting support for Proposition 1a.
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The aggregation of al-Qaeda required the emergence of leaders who
directly helped consolidate its structure and identity. We delineate the
function of leadership into direct (Proposition 1b) and indirect
(Proposition 2) activities.
There are numerous, highly celebrated examples of direct leadership
activity in the Islamic militancy movement in the twentieth century. The
behaviors predicted by Proposition 1b were illustrated when bin Laden
negotiated the formal merger of radical movements in 1998 (Bergen,
2001). Another example occurred when Al-Zawahiri and Sheik Rahman
(now imprisoned in the US for his role in the first WTC bombing) nego-
tiated the unification of the Jihad and Brotherhood movements in Egypt
in the early 1970s (Bergen, 2001). In addition Abdullah Azzam, who led
MaK in the 1980s, was an important broker for the confederation of
Islamic movements in the Afghanistan war (Bergen, 2001). Finally, cell
leaders brokered the accumulation of resources and kept cell members
with suicide roles focused (Bergen, 2001). These leadership behaviors
directly influenced correlation and the resolution of pertinent conflicting
constraints: Al-Zawahiri and Rahman negotiated differences in violence
levels between the two Egyptian groups; Azzam and bin Laden negoti-
ated nationalistic differences and promoted a Pan-Islamic attitude (i.e.,
correlation); cell leaders negotiated conflicts between survival drives and
martyrdom. We find evidence, then, to support Proposition 1b. 
THE AGGREGATION PROCESS IS SPED UP BY
CATALYSTS
A premise of complexity theory and complex leadership is that selection
forces (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Kieser, 1989; Singh & Lumsden, 1990),
traditionally thought to be the source of evolution and elaboration, are
not sufficiently powerful to produce the diversity and dynamic vibrancy
observed in social and organizational behavior. Selection is hampered by
its dependence on random or accidental change (Kauffman, 1993); it is
more useful for nudging a system in profitable directions as it emerges
than for creation and elaboration.
Instead, complexity overlays another dynamic on top of the selection
process, one that is internal to the emergent system and requires little
external motivating energy (as Kauffman, 1993, put it, “order is free”).
This dynamic is called “autocatalysis,” and refers to a tendency of recur-
sive systems to self-generate catalysts that speed up or enable the emer-
gence and evolution of forms (Kauffman, 1986, 1993).
VOLUME #5, ISSUE #1
61
Correlation and aggregation create initial, rudimentary structures, but
simple interaction alone (as with accident and natural selection) elabo-
rates slowly and unexceptionally. However, the interactive process also
“auto-generates” catalysts that enhance or speed up an emergent
dynamic. Catalysts, for example, can manifest as behavior that is copy-
catted (as occurs in mob activity); it may be structures that create their
own building blocks (e.g., organized labor in the early twentieth century);
or it may be external events that precipitate internal reaction (as hap-
pened after the initial court ruling in the Rodney King affair in Los
Angeles in 1992). Catalysts bring constituent agents into proximity and
enhance or stimulate the correlational process. Catalysts do quickly what
selection, with its random trials and errors, can only do slowly.  
John Holland (1995) describes this phenomenon from a different (but
overlapping) perspective, one that is more amenable to our discussion of
leadership. He observed the emergence of specialized catalytic forms in
his neural network simulations and coined the term “tag” to describe
what he observed. Generally, tags are catalytic “things” (as opposed to
events; a terrorist bombing is a catalyst but a bomber is a tag catalyst) that
lend overt, even deliberate, symbolic meaning to an emergent event. 
Tags perform two specific catalytic functions. First, by providing unify-
ing symbolic meaning, they delineate their systems from their environ-
ments, give them identity, and help bond constituent parts. Thus a tag can
be (among other things) an idea, a physical symbol of a system such as a
flag, a common enemy, or a belief. Second, tags can perform leadership
functions. As such, they serve to spark bottom-up activity rather than to
implant top-down expectations. Leadership tags function as unifying sym-
bols of a movement, they articulate its goals, and they embody its meaning.
Tags (including leaders) emerge out of, and owe their existence to, inter-
active dynamics. They rarely (we suspect, never) initiate an interactive
dynamic themselves; rather, they are produced by the broader dynamic. 
Earlier we argued that leaders could influence local dynamics with
direct leadership strategies (Proposition 1b). Tags influence aggregation
with indirect strategies; that is, they catalytically spark bottom-up activ-
ity. Direct leadership acts largely for selfish (locally focused) reasons and
its self-interest results in conflicting constraints at a higher level of inter-
action (leading to a mesh of conflicting constraints). Such a complex of
conflicting constraints can be resolved for the good of the whole system,
but the process is too convoluted for effective intelligent resolution
(Kauffman, 1993). To influence the process, leaders/complex adaptive
agents must exhibit indirect leadership behaviors. 
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Indirect leadership behaviors do not directly resolve conflicting con-
straints; rather, they stimulate conditions that both create conflicting con-
straints and foster conditions that permit their resolution. That is, they
foster network structures that present complexly interactive challenges,
create atmospheres that “empower” workers to deal with constraints,
enable network relationships that can work through constraints and use
them as springboards for creativity, and focus or speed up the process of
constraint resolution. 
Proposition 2: Catalysts are events or things that stimulate interactive
behaviors and speed up aggregation processes. An important form of
social catalyst is the tag, or “things” (including leaders) that symbolize
and help rally interacting agents, thus speeding and focusing aggre-
gation (indirect leadership). 
FINDINGS FOR PROPOSITION 2
There were several key events that served as catalysts to speed up the
emergence of organized terrorism in the Middle East. A particularly
important catalyst emerged out of the Second World War: the creation of
the Jewish state of Israel in 1948. This, perhaps more than any single
event, aroused Islamic anger and fed anti-Jewish attitudes (Emerson,
2002). Other catalyzing events include the Camp David Accord in 1979,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the US presence on what
is considered sacred Arabian soil following the Iraqi war (even moderate
Arabs chaff at this), and the US cruise missile retaliations for the bomb-
ing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (PBS Online, 2001). 
In each case, the catalyst enhanced Islamic resentment, stimulated
recruitment for militant groups, and helped different groups understand
their common objectives (that is, it sped up the correlational process; PBS
Online, 2001). The 1998 retaliations, for example, significantly enhanced
bin Laden’s reputation in the Middle East and lent urgency and credibil-
ity to the emergence of the mature field aggregate called the World
Islamic Front (PBS Online, 2001).
As we defined them earlier, tags are specialized forms of catalysts;
specifically, they are “things” (as opposed to events) that symbolize, artic-
ulate, or help unify a movement. Tags include leaders. There are numer-
ous examples of leadership tag behavior in the Islamic militancy
movement. Qutb, the 1950s leader of the Egyptian movement, articu-
lated the movement’s violence by calling it jihad (defined by moderates
as soul struggle; Bergen, 2001); similarly, al-Zawahiri articulated
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emerging pan-Islamic sentiments in the 1980s (Bergen, 2001). Bin Laden
became a rallying focus for anti-American anger following America’s
cruise missile bombing of a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and training
camps in Afghanistan (PBS Online, 2001). 
Tags serve to embody the attitudes, hopes, angers, fears, and actions
of a people, thus focusing their common purpose and identity. The rally-
ing capacity of such tags is far more important than their capacity for
action. Leaders like bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are more important as
symbols and articulators than as managers; indeed, the movement is far
too complex to be managed effectively. Al-Qaeda is sufficiently organic to
take care of itself. It needs tags, as proposed in Proposition 2, more than
managers.
COUPLING PATTERNS DETERMINE THE FITNESS OF
THE SYSTEM
A third critical aspect of complex systems relates to coupling patterns and
the fitness of the system. Specifically, interdependencies among agents
and aggregations are described in terms of coupling strength. Weak
coupling permits units to innovate and to adapt to the demands of their
environment, but provides only rudimentary structure for the dissemina-
tion of innovation or the consolidation of fitness (Weick, 1976). Tightly
coupled, or highly interdependent, systems offer ample structure for dis-
semination, but discourage innovation because of the demands of too
many conflicting constraints. When change does successfully intrude on
a tightly coupled system, it can spread rapidly through the multiple
chains of interdependency, often resulting in the collapse of the system. 
Complexity theory suggests that fit structures are primarily moder-
ately coupled but possess a diversity of weak and tightly coupled systems
as well (Kauffman, 1993; Marion, 1999). The predominant moderately
coupled structure is sufficiently loose to permit localized experiments
and adaptations, and sufficiently tight to challenge the structure with
conflicting constraints without freezing it into inaction (Kauffman, 1993;
Marion, 1999). A moderate number of conflicting constraints stimulate
the system to seek accommodations to the various need preferences. 
Some loose and tight structures within a moderately coupled system
are useful, however. Tightness can help a system resist change when deal-
ing with moderately changing environments (Kauffman, 1993). Tightly
coupled nodes within the system facilitate communication and coordina-
tion. They are also profitable targets for disruption, however. Carley and
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Ren (2001), for example, found that maximum damage can be inflicted on
a system by removing its tightly coupled communication centers. Loose
structures, by contrast, are sufficiently divorced from the mainstream sys-
tem to persist when the system is damaged, thus they can bridge differ-
ent emergent events.
Complex adaptive agents (CAAs; e.g., complex leaders) affect cou-
pling patterns in several important ways. First, they can stimulate inter-
dependency and interaction among units, thus enhancing the aggregation
process. Second, CAAs (particularly those in formal or recognized posi-
tions) typically seek to extend their control over organizational behavior
and to the degree they are successful they tighten the system’s depend-
ency on the leader (Pfeffer, 1997). This is particularly evident with charis-
matic leadership, which serves to enhance the fitness of an organization
but accomplishes this by restricting organizational behaviors to a highly
centralized vision (McKelvey, in press). Third, CAAs’ relationships to the
system often (but not necessarily) enable them to serve as centralized
communication nodes within that system. A CAA who is intimately inter-
active with the public, administrators, and workers may be an important
communication hub, for example. 
In general, complex leaders, or complex adaptive agents, are in a
position to enable (or inhibit) conditions that stimulate the effective cou-
pling of structures, ideas, and innovations. CAAs do not control effective
coupling, for control would deprive the emergent system of the creativ-
ity implicit in distributed networks of interacting, intelligent nodes.
Rather, they create the ambience necessary for effective coupling. They
do this, for example, in the way they structure formal subsystems, by
“planting seeds of innovation” (proposing ideas, providing resources or
slack time), by enabling decentralized decision making, by stimulating
interactions among different aggregates, and by stimulating inter-
dependency and conflicting constraints (e.g., organizing a system so that
changes in one aggregate affect the functioning of one or more other
aggregates). 
Proposition 3: Fit aggregates, meta-aggregates, and field aggregates are
moderately coupled in a network of interdependencies, but possess a
diversity of tight and loosely coupled subsystems. Complex leaders,
acting as complex adaptive agents, catalyze coupling, encourage tight-
ness, and may serve as tightly linked communication nodes. 
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FINDINGS FOR PROPOSITION 3
Details regarding the level of coupling within the al-Qaeda network are
difficult to ascertain because of the level of secrecy that characterizes this
organization, but there is sufficient secondary information to make gen-
eral statements. Coupling patterns will be explored from two perspec-
tives: the operational level of terrorist cells, and the broad, overall
structure of the organization. 
Operationally, one can describe coupling in terrorist cells using a
fairly well-documented incident: the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.
There were two onsite cells in Yemen working on this effort (Bergen,
2001). One cell performed the logistical work of collecting resources,
arranging to obtain boats to deliver explosives, obtaining safe houses,
conducting surveillance, and hiring low-level help. The second cell was
responsible for loading explosives into the boat, conducting the actual
bombing attempt, and seeing that it was filmed for recruiting uses. These
cells were tightly coordinated by facilitators who were responsible for
coordinating activities within and between the operational cells, keeping
the suicide bomber committed, coordinating resources and training
preparation, general logistics, and communicating with outside contacts
(Bergen, 2001; see also Associated Press, 2001; Engel, 2001). Terrorist
cells, then, are tightly coupled internally.
Externally, the cells appear to be moderately coupled to a fairly
large network of support (although the evidence regarding coupling was
at times contradictory: Associated Press, 2001; Emerson, 2002). The
facilitators were communication nodes within the cell (Bergen, 2001).
They had access to sophisticated communication tools, including satel-
lite telephones, fax machines, and email. Cell facilitators and members
traveled frequently to meet with resource providers and to smuggle
money and explosives (Newsweek, 2001). If the Cole bombers used the
same modus operandi as the 9/11 bombers, their resource providers
included banks in Dubai, rich Saudi and Kuwaiti businessmen, and
cells operating within the Middle East and Europe that obtained explo-
sives and solicited and laundered money (Hosenball, 2002). There is
also evidence that terrorist cells communicated with members of other
terrorist groups. Steven Emerson (2002), for example, traced phone
calls of the 1993 WTC bombing suspects and found that they had been
in contact with, among others, the spiritual leader of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad. 
We are uncertain about the level of coordination exerted over cells by
the leadership core in Afghanistan. There is evidence that various al-
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Qaeda leadership operatives were involved in planning and supporting
terrorist activities (Eggen & Dobbs, 2002; Hirschkorn, 2001), but on bal-
ance cells appear to have had significant freedom to interact with other
terrorist group leaders and with resource providers, and were given lati-
tude to exploit their environments (Isikoff et al., 2001; Klaidman &
Isikoff, 2002). Terrorist plots were sophisticated, requiring (among other
things) detailed planning, access to resources, access to training, to forged
passports, and to laundered money (Struck et al., 2001). Networks of sup-
port had to be rather extensive and terrorists required a certain amount
of flexibility to accomplish their sophisticated objectives (Struck et al.,
2001). Tightly controlled external couplings would not likely have pro-
vided sufficient flexibility to launch major activities such as the Cole or
the 9/11 bombings. 
The terrorist cells that conducted the Cole and the 2001 WTC bomb-
ings, then, appear to have been moderately coupled to a fairly broad
network of support, but tightly coupled internally. This is consistent with
our definition of coupling fitness in Proposition 3.
The broader network of al-Qaeda is represented by Figure 1. It is com-
posed of a leadership core, bankers and money exchangers, training
camps, mosques and radical imans, businesses, nongovernmental (charity)
organizations (NGOs), allied terrorist groups, operational cells, support
organizations in America and Europe, and Islamic conferences (Emerson,
2002). Interestingly, bin Laden’s leadership core is not intimately con-
nected in this network; that is, its direct influence over elements of the
network is limited. This suggests that the network would survive the loss
of this leadership core. However, the linkages in Figure 1 are physical link-
ages representing channels of direct influence. Were we to overlay link-
ages representing symbolic influence, the leadership core would be highly
connected within the broader network. Bin Laden’s symbolic, unifying
importance in the emergence and cohesiveness of this network is signifi-
cant. His most important role is that of tag, as defined for this article.
Physically, the broad terrorist network appears to be moderately inter-
dependent (Eggen & Dobbs, 2002; Hosenball, 2002; Isikoff et al., 2001;
Klaidman & Isikoff, 2002; Newsweek, 2001; Struck et al., 2001). Terrorist
groups communicate and cooperate with one another—radical Islamic
conferences in the US, for example, draw participants from a number of
terrorist organizations (Emerson, 2002)—but they do not control one
another’s activities. NGOs and other fund-raising agents use third world
banks to conceal how their money is distributed, but they are not
controlled by those banks (Hosenball, 2002). Leaders within cells serve
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as local communication hubs and are in some ways tightly controlled by
central leadership, although in other ways they have significant discre-
tion. Higher-level leaders in al-Qaeda coordinate to some extent the flow
of money within the organization, and they provide some level of coordi-
nation for terrorist cell activity (Hosenball, 2002). There is little evidence
that they control the activities of NGOs, Islamic support groups in the
West, or conferences (Emerson, 2002).  
The training camps are important communication nodes in this net-
work; these camps enable terrorists to develop a sense of common pur-
pose with other terrorists and a sense of identity with the broader militant
movement. Consequently, they are useful targets for interdiction. The
banking, business, and NGO constituents are highly decentralized and
dispersed (loosely coupled), by contrast, thus seriously hampering post-
9/11 efforts to interdict the flow of money. 
We argue that the evidence supports Proposition 3.
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Figure 1 Simplified representation of the al-Qaeda network. Subcategories
identify the given component’s functions; arrows indicate direction of mod-
erately to tightly coupled dependency. Al-Qaeda refers to bin Laden’s
leadership core. Each component is itself comprised of numerous aggre-
gates linked in loose to tightly coupled networks of interdependency. 
HUMAN CAPITAL IS MAXIMALLY ENABLED WITHIN
MODERATELY COUPLED DISTRIBUTED INTELLIGENCE
NETWORKS
Finally, complexity theory argues that human capital is maximally
enabled when it is organized within distributed intelligence (DI) net-
works that are moderately coupled with one another (Marion, 1999;
McKelvey, in press). According to complexity, each aggregate (a unit that
can be as small as a single individual) in an organization possesses a level
of intelligence; Becker (1975) refers to this as “human capital.” It is
tempting—but, according to complexity perspectives, incorrect—to
assume that competent human capital alone is a sufficient foundation for
fit and productive organizational behavior. One might assume, for exam-
ple, that leaders should focus on hiring competent people and working to
assure that they function at peak efficiency. However, even genius may be
minimally productive if isolated from other social actors (Marion, 1999;
McKelvey, in press). 
Theorists since 1980 have increasingly observed that an organization’s
fitness and creativity are a product not just of its human capital, but also
of its social systems or social capital (Burt, 1992; see also Burt, 1997;
Granovetter, 1985; Masterson, 2000; Settoon et al., 1996; Uhl-Bien et al.,
2000). Following Fonseca (2002), we extend this a step further.
Knowledge is not the exclusive property of individuals (human capital) or
of groups (social capital); rather, it is derived from interaction (Drath,
2001) among people and among heterogeneous groups. That is, human
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Figure 2 Timeline of key events, catalysts, and aggregation periods in
the emergence of Islamic terrorism
and social capital are maximally enabled when embedded within appro-
priate networks of interaction and interdependency. McKelvey (in press)
adds that the nodes of a distributed intelligence network should optimally
possess diverse skills and outlooks; that is, they should be heterogeneous.
We propose the term “interaction capital” to capture all of this.
Interaction capital suggests that innovations by aggregates in properly
interacting DI networks can influence innovations in other aggregates.
Other aggregates within the network will likewise produce innovations of
their own, and eventually innovations will start to link, thus creating
larger or more sophisticated innovations. Occasionally the process will
grow so large that it leads to major change or introduces major new
innovation.
DI dynamics emerge bottom-up. Bottom-up activity produces far
greater complex behavior that can be produced by (top-down) deliberate
human planning or coordination (Kauffman, 1993; Marion, 1999; Marion
& Uhl-Bien, 2001). Leadership that recognizes this and fosters conditions
enabling bottom-up coordination and the development of moderately
coupled structures in which ideas can emerge freely and find one another
will be effective in maximizing interaction capital (Drath, 2001; Marion &
Uhl-Bien, 2001).
Proposition 4: Moderately coupled, complex systems function as distrib-
uted intelligence (DI) networks. Leadership in al-Qaeda was con-
ducive to the emergence of moderately coupled DI networks, thus
maximally enabling its interaction capital.
FINDINGS FOR PROPOSITION 4
Moderately coupled, distributed intelligence networks of heterogeneous
nodes, when stimulated by conflicting constraints to experiment and
innovate, tend to foster meta- (more sophisticated) ideas and field ideas.
From this perspective, they are networks of self-aggregating analytical
units in much the same way that the brain is a self-aggregating (i.e., learn-
ing) network of interacting neurons. 
We have already argued that al-Qaeda is a moderately coupled net-
work of heterogeneous agents, thus it is a DI system. The question
implicit in Proposition 4, then, is: What did al-Qaeda leadership do to
enable a moderately coupled DI network?
Bin Laden and his colleagues enabled moderate coupling by failing,
either intentionally or (more likely) by necessity, to consolidate power
over the system. The leadership instead served the important complex
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leadership role of tag, in that it articulated and symbolized Islamic mili-
tancy. As tag, it encouraged innovative behavior and initiatives across the
world and lent a sense of unity and identity to Islamic militancy. 
Al-Qaeda catalyzed the emergence and growth of militant move-
ments, western Muslim advocacy groups, NGO support groups, radical
mosques, banking and money-exchange networks, and media outlets
(Emerson, 2002). Often they merely reaped the benefit of structures that
appeared unbidden (the social support organizations in the US, for exam-
ple). Indeed, we could find little evidence that the emergence and expan-
sion of many of the systems supporting al-Qaeda, particularly those at the
field level, were centrally planned. Rather, the cumulative evidence sug-
gests that they emerged bottom-up and found niches in the broader net-
work (e.g., see Emerson’s 2002 discussion). Al-Qaeda leadership
provided models of creativity, dropped seeds of innovation, encouraged
innovative initiatives, stimulated the growth of supporting resources, and
largely stayed out of the way of spontaneous growth and innovation. We
submit that this evidence supports Proposition 4.
DISCUSSION
Examining complex leadership, using al-Qaeda to illustrate its dynamics,
offers important new perspectives of effective leadership. Leadership
models have traditionally placed strong emphasis on “the leader” and
control (Fayol, 1916), and our implicit leadership theories are heavily
grounded in this model (Jermier, 1998). Complex leadership changes our
paradigms regarding both leaders and leadership by viewing leaders
more broadly, beyond formal roles, and by identifying direct and indirect
(e.g., complex adaptive agent) leadership behaviors. Individuals who
engage in adaptive behaviors—not just those in formal leadership roles—
act as leaders, blurring the lines between leaders and followers and
emphasizing the importance of emergence in complex adaptive systems
(Marion, 1999). 
Rather than directing and controlling, complex leaders help negotiate
conflicting constraints to create correlational bonds that produce aggre-
gation (direct leadership). Creation of these bonds helps them to emerge
as leaders in the system (e.g., leaders “bubble up” and are held up by the
system; when one falls, another can rise up as a replacement). Complex
leaders, acting as complex adaptive agents, also capitalize on situations
that create conflicting constraints and foster conditions that permit the
interaction of a complex of constraints (i.e., indirect leadership), thus
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enabling aggregation, innovation, and fitness. That is, they foster network
structures that present complexly interactive challenges, create atmos-
pheres that “empower” others to deal with constraints, and enable net-
work relationships that can work through constraints and use them as
springboards for creativity. 
The case of al-Qaeda provides an illustration of complex leadership
enacted. Our analysis provides evidence indicating that al-Qaeda exem-
plifies a complex organization with complex leadership. It appears to be
the product of bottom-up aggregation enabled by direct and indirect
leadership processes. Rather than starting with a leader and with specific
goals, al-Qaeda and its leaders emerged from a wave of strong sentiment
in the Middle East into a powerful field aggregate, with a vast network of
resources and capability. Al-Qaeda leaders did not create this movement,
but rather were created by it. Through direct leadership behaviors, they
forged alliances that helped increase the power of the network. Through
indirect leadership behaviors they capitalized on opportunities (e.g., cat-
alysts) that emerged out of network dynamics, and helped serve as tags to
catalyze al-Qaeda’s structure and activities. 
Al-Qaeda leadership, through choice or necessity, appeared to have
maintained and fostered a moderately coupled network, but one pos-
sessing internal structures that were loosely and tightly organized as
appropriate. This feature of al-Qaeda is critically important because it
helps ensure survival of the network in the face of direct threat. Tight
coupling occurs when leaders implement rigid controls in a system in
order to direct activities and to be informed of decision making. Loose
coupling refers to functional independence; it allows systems to survive
dramatic system-wide perturbations. Moderate coupling allows the net-
work to engage in independent decision making as needed, but also to
withstand threats to the system. Moderate coupling is not so loose that
it sacrifices the united effort toward the common cause, but it is suffi-
ciently loose to maintain flexibility. Finally, al-Qaeda leadership acted in
ways that linked diverse agents in a distributed intelligence network.
This enabled creativity and innovation on a large scale (such as that
needed to pull off the 9/11 events), and helped assure the broadly based
viability of the system.
Organizing according to complex leadership principles would mean
that the leadership of the network gives up certain things: insistence that
the “top” of the organization is kept fully informed of the actions of the
members; control over the linkages formed by network members (rather,
members form their own network linkages); and authority over actions of
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the members (rather, members act on their own within the overall mis-
sion of “wreak havoc on the enemy”). The role of the “top” would be to
continue to catalyze the mission, recruit new members (e.g., create cor-
relational bonds), promote activities within the context of the mission
(e.g., fatwas), and provide resources and network contacts. The role of the
network members would be to foster interconnectivity and create link-
ages that further advance the power of the network to meet the mission
of the organization.
As a result, al-Qaeda represents a highly adaptive learning organiza-
tion that, in many ways, keeps one step ahead of the more sophisticated
and developed western nations that it opposes. In a sense, it is like bac-
teria that manage to work around the best efforts to eradicate them. This
is important to understand, because the use of traditional leadership par-
adigms to view al-Qaeda may result in inappropriate reactions and
responses. Complexity perspectives tell us that going after al-Qaeda’s top
leadership would not be enough to take care of the problem, and might
even create a catalyst to further energize the system. While bin Laden is
a charismatic leader (Eggen & Dobbs, 2002), he did not make himself so
central to the al-Qaeda network that innovation is restricted to his vision
or the movement would die with his demise. 
Instead, the present analysis shows that al-Qaeda is the product of
interaction capital and is not the brainchild of an individual. Its strength
does not reside in its leaders, although its leader tags were important to
its development and fitness. Its strength resides in its complexity. This is
highlighted by the quote at the beginning of this article (from al-Qaeda
apologist Saad Al-Fagih): 
If bin Laden was not there, you would have another bin Laden. You would
have another name, with the same character, with the same role, of bin
Laden now. That’s why we call it a phenomena [sic] not a person. (PBS
Online, 2001)
Magnus Ranstorp, deputy director of the Centre for the Study of
Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in
Scotland, adds:
[Al-Qaeda] is directed from the bottom up as much as the top down. The
typical pattern before September 11th was of local al Qaeda cells initiat-
ing reconnaissance of potential targets, planning and then going back to
the al Qaeda leadership for approval and possible funding. The foot
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soldiers are self-initiating and self-sustaining. (Quoted in Eggen & Dobbs,
2002)
In other words, contrary to many conceptualizations that leadership is the
predominant force in the creation and survival of organizations, complex
leadership and the case of al-Qaeda show that leadership is not necessar-
ily a person (or a formal role) but a phenomenon created by, and residing
in, a complex adaptive system. 
The implications of this are powerful. Al-Qaeda is composed of a
diversity of individuals and groups who join based on common need and
shared vision (e.g., they internalize the goals and values), are provided
with resources and contacts with whom they can develop plans for attack,
and then are told to “go wreak havoc on the enemy” (e.g., the mission)
without requirements for bureaucratic oversight or micro-managing from
above. Such a system represents an incredibly forceful and resilient orga-
nizational form. 
While there is obviously much that we don’t know about this organi-
zation, or the leadership of complex networks in general, it does seem
that by examining organizations through a new lens of complex leader-
ship we may be able to generate insight for organizational leadership far
beyond traditional views (which may be limiting us currently). One might
argue that the examples of complex leadership examined in this article
may be so different from the experiences of business organizations that
their generalizability is subject to question, particularly regarding the
issue of control and accountability. However, others argue that our cur-
rent views of control may be as extreme in the opposite direction (i.e., too
much control), and that current organizational structures inhibit the cre-
ativity and flexibility needed to survive in a rapidly expanding informa-
tion age (Stacey et al., 2000). 
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